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Subject: 89-1714, 90-113 & 90-114 -- OPINION, PAULEY v. BETHENERGY MINES




NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


Nos. 89-1714, 90-113 and 90-114


HARRIET PAULEY, survivor of JOHN C. PAULEY, PETITIONER v. 89-1714
BETHENERGY MINES, INC., et al.


on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third
circuit

CLINCHFIELD COAL COMPANY, PETITIONER
v.
90-113
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al.

CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY, PETITIONER
v.
90-114
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al.

on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth
circuit

[June 24, 1991]



    Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court.
    The black lung benefits program, created by Congress, was to be
administered first by the Social Security Administration (SSA) under the
auspices of the then-existent Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW), and later by

the Department of Labor (DOL).  Congress authorized

these Departments, during their respective tenures, to adopt interim
regulations governing the adjudication of claims for black lung benefits,
but constrained the Secretary of Labor by providing that the DOL
regulations "shall not be more restrictive than" HEW's.  This litigation
calls upon us to determine whether the Secretary of Labor has complied with
that constraint.

I


A
    The black lung benefits program was enacted originally as Title IV of
the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (FCMHSA), 83 Stat. 792,
30 U. S. C. MDRV 901 et seq., to provide benefits for miners totally
disabled due at least in part to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine
employment, and to the dependents and survivors of such miners.  See
Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U. S. 105, 108 (1988); Mullins Coal Co.
v. Director, OWCP, 484 U. S. 135, 138 (1987).
    Through FCMHSA, Congress established a bifurcated system of
compensating miners disabled by pneumoconiosis. {1}  Part B thereof created
a temporary program administered by the Social Security Administration
under the auspices of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
This program was intended for the processing of claims filed on or before
December 31, 1972.  Benefits awarded under part B were paid by the Federal
Government.  For claims filed after 1972, part C originally authorized a
permanent program, administered by the Secretary of Labor, to be
coordinated with federally approved state workmen's compensation programs.
Benefits awarded under part C were to be paid by the claimants' coal mining
employers.
    Under FCMHSA, the Secretary of HEW was authorized to promulgate
permanent regulations regarding the determination and adjudication of part
B claims.  30 U. S. C. MDRV 921(b).  The Secretary's discretion was
limited, however, by three statutory presumptions defining eligibility
under the part B program.  MDRV 921(c).  For a claimant suffering from
pneumoconiosis who could establish 10 years of coal mine employment, there
"shall be a rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out of
such employment."  MDRV 921(c)(1).  Similarly, for a miner with at least 10
years of coal mine employment who "died from a respirable disease there
shall be a rebuttable presumption that his death was due to
pneumoconiosis."  MDRV 921(c)(2).  Finally, there was an irrebuttable
presumption that a miner presenting medical evidence demonstrating
complicated pneumoconiosis was totally disabled as a result of that
condition.  MDRV 921(c)(3).  Consistent with these presumptions, HEW
promulgated permanent regulations prescribing the methods and standards for
establishing entitlement to black lung benefits under part B.  See 20 CFR
15 410.401 to 410.476 (1990).

B
    Dissatisfied with the increasing backlog of unadjudicated claims and
the relatively high rate of claim denials resulting from the application of
the HEW permanent regulations, Congress in 1972 amended FCMSHA and
redesignated Title IV of that Act as the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972.
86 Stat. 150.  See S. Rep. No. 92-743 (1972).  See also Comptroller General
of the United States, General Accounting Office, Report to the Congress:
Achievements, Administrative Problems, and Costs in Paying Black Lung
Benefits to Coal Miners and Their Widows 16-18 (September 5, 1972)
(nationally, as of December 31, 1971, claims filed were 347,716, claims
processed were 322,582, and rate of claim denial was 50.5 percent).  In
addition to extending the coverage of part B to those claims filed by
living miners prior to July 1, 1973, and those filed by survivors before
January 1, 1974, the 1972 amendments liberalized in several ways the
criteria and procedures applicable to part B claims.  First, the amendments
added a fourth statutory presumption of total disability due to
pneumoconiosis for claimants unable to produce X-ray evidence of the
disease.  This presumption applied to a claimant with 15 years of coal mine
employment who presented evidence of a totally disabling respiratory or
pulmonary impairment.  Congress expressly limited rebuttal of the
presumption to a showing that the miner did not have pneumoconiosis or that
his respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of employment in
a coal mine.  30 U. S. C. MDRV 921(c)(4).  Second, the 1972 amendments
redefined "total disability" to permit an award of benefits on a showing
that a miner was unable to perform his coal mining duties or other
comparable work -- as opposed to the prior requirement that the miner
demonstrate that he was unable to perform any job, see MDRV 902(f) -- and
prohibited HEW from denying a claim for benefits solely on the basis of a
negative X ray.  MDRV 923(b).  Third, the 1972 amendments made it easier
for survivors of a deceased miner who had been disabled due to
pneumoconiosis but had died from a cause unrelated to the disease to
demonstrate eligibility for benefits.  See MDRV 901.  Finally, the
amendments made clear that "[i]n determining the validity of claims under
[part B], all relevant evidence shall be considered."  MDRV 923(b).
    In response to these amendments, the Secretary of HEW adopted interim
regulations "designed to `permit prompt and vigorous processing of the
large backlog of claims' that had developed during the early phases of
administering part B."  Sebben, 488 U. S., at 109, quoting 20 CFR
410.490(a) (1973). {2}  These interim regulations established adjudicatory
rules for processing part B claims that permit the invocation of a
presumption of eligibility upon demonstration by the claimant of specified
factors, and a subsequent opportunity for the Social Security
Administration, in administering the program, to rebut the presumption.
    Specifically, the HEW interim regulations permit claimants to invoke a
rebuttable presumption that a miner is "totally disabled due to
pneumoconiosis" in one of two ways.  First, the claimant can introduce an X
ray, a biopsy, or an autopsy indicating pneumoconiosis.  20 CFR MDRV
410.490(b)(1) (i) (1990).  Second, for a miner with at least 15 years of
coal mine employment, a claimant may introduce ventilatory studies
establishing the presence of a chronic respiratory or pulmonary disease.
MDRV 410.490(b)(1)(ii).  In either case, in order to invoke the
presumption, the claimant also must demonstrate that the "impairment
established in accordance with paragraph (b)(1) of this section arose out
of coal mine employment (see 15 410.416 and 410.456)."  MDRV
410.490(b)(2).
    Once a claimant invokes the presumption of eligibility under MDRV
410.490(b), the HEW interim regulations permit rebuttal by the SSA upon a
showing that the miner is doing his usual coal mine work or comparable and
gainful work, or is capable of doing such work.  See MDRV 410.490(c).
    The statutory changes adopted by the 1972 amendments and the
application of HEW's interim regulations resulted in a surge of claims
approvals under part B.  See Lopatto, The Federal Black Lung Program: A
1983 Primer, 85 W. Va. L. Rev. 677, 686 (1983) (demonstrating that the
overall approval rate for part B claims had substantially increased by
December 31, 1974).  Because the HEW interim regulations expired with the
part B program, however, the Secretary of Labor was constrained to
adjudicate all part C claims, i. e., those filed after June 30, 1973, by
living miners, and after December 31, 1973, by survivors, under the more
stringent permanent HEW regulations.  See Sebben, 488 U. S., at 110.
Neither the Congress nor the Secretary of Labor was content with the
application to part C claims of the unwieldy and restrictive permanent
regulations.  See Letter, dated Sept. 13, 1974, of William J. Kilberg,
Solicitor of Labor, to John B. Rhinelander, General Counsel, Department of
HEW, appearing in H. R. Rep. No. 94-770, p. 14 (1975).  Not only did the
application of the permanent regulations cause the DOL to process claims
slowly, but the DOL's claims approval rate was significantly below that of
the SSA.  See Lopatto, supra, at 691.  Accordingly, Congress turned its
attention once again to the black lung benefits program.

C
    The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 (BLBRA), 92 Stat. 95,
approved and effective Mar. 1, 1978, further liberalized the criteria for
eligibility for black lung benefits in several ways.  First, the Act
expanded the definition of pneumoconiosis to include "sequelae" of the
disease, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments arising out of
coal mine employment.  See 30 U. S. C. MDRV 902(b).  Second, BLBRA required
the DOL to accept a board-certified or board-eligible radiologist's
interpretation of submitted X rays if the films met minimal quality
standards, thereby prohibiting the DOL from denying a claim based on a
secondary assessment of the X rays provided by a Governmentfunded
radiologist.  See MDRV 923(b).  Finally, the BLBRA added a fifth
presumption of eligibility and otherwise altered the entitlement structure
to make it easier for survivors of a deceased long-term miner to obtain
benefits.  See 15 921(c) (5) and 902(f).
    In addition to liberalizing the statutory prerequisites to benefit
entitlement, the BLBRA authorized the DOL to adopt its own interim
regulations for processing part C claims filed before March 31, 1980.  In
so doing, Congress required that the "[c]riteria applied by the Secretary
of Labor . . . shall not be more restrictive than the criteria applicable
to a claim filed on June 30, 1973."  MDRV 902(f)(2).
    The Secretary of Labor, pursuant to this authorization, adopted interim
regulations governing the adjudication of part C claims.  These regulations
differ significantly from the HEW interim regulations.  See 20 CFR MDRV
727.203 (1990).  The DOL regulations include two presumption provisions
similar to the two presumption provisions in the HEW interim regulations.
Compare 15 727.203(a)(1) and (2) with 15 410.490 (b)(1)(i) and (ii).  To
invoke the presumption of eligibility under these two provisions, however,
a claimant need not prove that the "impairment . . . arose out of coal mine
employment," as was required under the HEW interim regulations.  See MDRV
410.490(b)(2).
    In addition, the DOL interim regulations add three methods of invoking
the presumption of eligibility not included in the HEW interim regulations.
Specifically, under the DOL regulations, a claimant can invoke the
presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis by submitting blood
gas studies that demonstrate the presence of an impairment in the transfer
of oxygen from the lung alveoli to the blood; by submitting other medical
evidence establishing the presence of a totally disabling respiratory or
pulmonary impairment; or, in the case of a deceased miner for whom no
medical evidence is available, by submitting a survivor's affidavit
demonstrating such a disability.  See 15 727.203(a)(3), (4), and (5).
    Finally, the DOL interim regulations provide four methods for rebutting
the presumptions established under MDRV 727.203.  Two of the rebuttal
provisions mimic those in the HEW regulations, permitting rebuttal upon a
showing that the miner is performing or is able to perform his coal mining
or comparable work.  See 15 727.203(b)(1) and (2).  The other two rebuttal
provisions are at issue in these cases.  Under these provisions, a
presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis can be rebutted if
"[t]he evidence establishes that the total disability or death of the miner
did not arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employment," or if
"[t]he evidence establishes that the miner does not, or did not, have
pneumoconiosis."  See 15 727.203(b)(3) and (4).

II
    The three cases before us present the question whether the DOL's
interim regulations are "more restrictive than" the HEW's interim
regulations by virtue of the third and fourth rebuttal provisions, and
therefore are inconsistent with the agency's statutory authority.  In No.
89-1714, Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit concluded that the DOL interim regulations were not more
restrictive.  BethEnergy Mines, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 890 F. 2d 1295
(1989).  John Pauley, the nowdeceased husband of petitioner Harriet Pauley,
filed a claim for black lung benefits on April 21, 1978, after he had
worked 30 years in the underground mines of Pennsylvania.  Pauley stopped
working soon after he filed his claim for benefits.  At a formal hearing on
November 5, 1987, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Pauley had
begun to experience shortness of breath, coughing, and fatigue in 1974, and
that those symptoms had gradually worsened, causing him to leave his job in
the mines.  The ALJ also found that Pauley had arthritis requiring several
medications daily, had suffered a stroke in January 1987, and had smoked
cigarettes for 34 years until he stopped in 1974.
    Because respondent BethEnergy did not contest the presence of coal
workers' pneumoconiosis, the ALJ found that the presumption had been
invoked under MDRV 727.203(a)(1).  Turning to the rebuttal evidence, the
judge concluded that Pauley was not engaged in his usual coal mine work or
comparable and gainful work, and that Pauley was totally disabled from
returning to coal mining or comparable employment.  See 15 727.203(b)(1)
and (2).  The judge then weighed the evidence submitted under MDRV
727.203(b)(3), and determined that respondent BethEnergy had sustained its
burden of establishing that pneumoconiosis was not a contributing factor in
Pauley's total disability and, accordingly, that his disability did not
"arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employment."  MDRV
727.203(b)(3).  See Carozza v. United States Steel Corp., 727 F. 2d 74 (CA3
1984).
    Having determined that Pauley was not entitled to receive black lung
benefits under the DOL interim regulations, the ALJ felt constrained by
Third Circuit precedent to apply the HEW interim regulations to Pauley's
claim.  He first concluded that respondent BethEnergy's concession that
Pauley had pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mining employment was
sufficient to invoke the presumption of total disability due to
pneumoconiosis under MDRV 410.490(b).  Because the evidence demonstrated
Pauley's inability to work, and the ALJ interpreted MDRV 410.490(c) as
precluding rebuttal of the presumption by "showing that the claimant's
total disability is unrelated to his coal mine employment," the judge found
that BethEnergy could not carry its burden on rebuttal, and that Pauley was
entitled to benefits.
    After the ALJ denied its motion for reconsideration, BethEnergy
appealed unsuccessfully to the Benefits Review Board.  It then sought
review in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  That court reversed.
It pointed out that the decisions of the ALJ and the Benefits Review Board
created "two disturbing circumstances."  890 F. 2d, at 1299.  First, the
court found it "surely extraordinary," ibid., that a determination that
Pauley was totally disabled from causes unrelated to pneumoconiosis, which
was sufficient to rebut the presumption under MDRV 727.203(b)(3), would
preclude respondent BethEnergy from rebutting the presumption under MDRV
410.490(c).  Second, the court considered it to be "outcome determinative"
that the purpose of the Benefits Act is to provide benefits to miners
totally disabled at least in part due to pneumoconiosis if the disability
arises out of coal mine employment, and that the ALJ had made unchallenged
findings that Pauley's disability did not arise even in part out of such
employment.  890 F. 2d, at 1299-1300.  The court found it to be "perfectly
evident that no set of regulations under [the Benefits Act] may provide
that a claimant who is statutorily barred from recovery may nevertheless
recover."  Id., at 1300.
    Asserting that this Court's decision in Sebben, supra, was not
controlling because that decision concerned only the invocation of the
presumption and not its rebuttal, the court then concluded that Congress'
mandate that the criteria used by the Secretary of Labor be not more
restrictive than the criteria applicable to a claim filed on June 30, 1973,
applied only to the criteria for determining whether a claimant is "totally
disabled," not to the criteria used in rebuttal.  Finally, the court
pointed out that its result would not differ if it applied the rebuttal
provisions of MDRV 410.490(c) to Pauley's claim, because subsections (c)(1)
and (2) make reference to MDRV 410.412 (a), which refers to a miner's being
"totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis."  According to the Third Circuit,
there would be no reason for the regulations to include such a reference
"unless it was the intention of the Secretary to permit rebuttal by a
showing that the claimant's disability did not arise at least in part from
coal mine employment."  890 F. 2d, at 1302.
    In the two other cases now before us, No. 90-113, Clinchfield Coal Co.
v. Director, OWCP, and No. 90-114, Consolidation Coal Co. v. Director,
OWCP, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit struck down the DOL
interim regulations.  John Taylor, a respondent in No. 90-113, applied for
black lung benefits in 1976, after having worked for almost 12 years as a
coal loader and roof bolter in underground coal mines.  The ALJ found that
Taylor properly had invoked the presumption of eligibility for benefits
under MDRV 727.203(a)(3), based on qualifying arterial blood gas studies
demonstrating an impairment in the transfer of oxygen from his lungs to his
blood.  The ALJ then proceeded to weigh the rebuttal evidence, consisting
of negative X-ray evidence, nonqualifying ventilatory study scores, and
several medical reports respectively submitted by Taylor and by his
employer, petitioner Clinchfield Coal Company.  In light of this evidence,
the ALJ concluded that Taylor neither suffered from pneumoconiosis nor was
totally disabled.  Rather, the evidence demonstrated that Taylor suffered
from chronic bronchitis caused by 30 years of cigarette smoking and
obesity.  The Benefits Review Board affirmed, concluding that the ALJ's
decision was supported by substantial evidence.
    The Court of Appeals reversed.  Taylor v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 895 F.
2d 178 (1990).  The court first dismissed the argument that the DOL interim
regulations cannot be considered more restrictive than HEW's as applied to
Taylor because Taylor invoked the presumption of eligibility based on
arterial blood gas studies, a method of invocation available under the DOL
regulations but not under HEW's, and was therefore unable to use the
rebuttal provisions of the HEW interim regulations as a benchmark.  Id., at
182.  The court reasoned that it was a "matter of indifference" how the
claimant invoked the presumption of eligibility, and rejected the argument
that the rebuttal provisions must be evaluated in light of corresponding
invocation provisions.  "It is the fact of establishment of the presumption
and the substance thereof which is of consequence in this case, not the
number of the regulation which provides for such establishment."  Ibid.
    Focusing on the DOL's rebuttal provisions in isolation, the Fourth
Circuit determined that the third and fourth rebuttal methods "permit
rebuttal of more elements of entitlement to benefits than do the interim
HEW regulations," because the HEW regulations permit rebuttal "solely
through attacks on the element of total disability," while the DOL
regulations "allow the consideration of evidence disputing both the
presence of pneumoconiosis and the connection between total disability and
coal mine employment."  Ibid.  Accordingly, the court concluded that the
DOL interim regulations were more restrictive than those found in MDRV
410.490, and that the application of these regulations violated 30 U. S. C.
MDRV 902(f). {3}
    One judge dissented.  Noting that the panel's decision was in conflict
with the Sixth Circuit in Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Co. v. Milliken, 866
F. 2d 195 (1989), and with the Third Circuit in Pauley, he concluded that
those decisions "do less violence to congressional intent, and avoid . . .
upsetting the statutory scheme."  895 F. 2d, at 184.
    Albert Dayton, a respondent in No. 90-114, applied for black lung
benefits in 1979, after having worked as a coal miner for 17 years.  The
ALJ found that Dayton had invoked the presumption of eligibility based on
ventilatory test scores showing a chronic pulmonary condition.  The judge
then determined that petitioner Consolidation Coal Company had successfully
rebutted the presumption under 15 727.203(b)(2) and (4) by demonstrating
that Dayton did not have pneumoconiosis and, in any event, that Dayton's
pulmonary impairment was not totally disabling.  The Benefits Review Board
affirmed, concluding that the medical evidence demonstrated that Dayton's
pulmonary condition was unrelated to coal dust exposure, but was instead
secondary to his smoking and "other ailments," and that the ALJ had
correctly concluded that Consolidation had rebutted the presumption under
MDRV 727.203(b)(4). {4}
    The Fourth Circuit reversed.  Dayton v. Consolidation Coal Co., 895 F.
2d 173 (1990).  Relying on its decision in Taylor, the court held that 30
U. S. C. MDRV 902(f) required Dayton's claim to be adjudicated "under the
less restrictive rebuttal standards of MDRV 410.490."  895 F. 2d, at 175.
Concluding that the HEW regulations did not permit rebuttal upon a showing
that the claimant does not have pneumoconiosis, the court stated that the
ALJ's finding that Dayton does not have pneumoconiosis "is superfluous and
has no bearing on the case."  Id., at 176, n. *.
    In view of the conflict among the Courts of Appeals, we granted
certiorari in the three cases and consolidated them for hearing in order to
resolve the issue of statutory construction.  --- U. S. --- (1990). {5}

III
    We turn to the statutory text that provides that "[c]riteria applied by
the Secretary of Labor . . . shall not be more restrictive than the
criteria applicable" under the interim HEW regulations.  30 U. S. C. MDRV
902(f)(2).  See Sebben, 488 U. S., at 113.  Specifically, we must determine
whether the third and fourth rebuttal provisions in the DOL regulations
render the DOL regulations more restrictive than were the HEW regulations.
These provisions permit rebuttal of the presumption of eligibility upon a
showing that the miner's disability did not arise in whole or in part out
of coal mine employment or that the miner does not have pneumoconiosis.
{6}

A
    In the BLBRA, Congress specifically constrained the Secretary of
Labor's discretion through the directive that the criteria applied to part
C claims could "not be more restrictive than" that applied to part B
claims.  30 U. S. C. MDRV 902(f)(2).  The claimants and the dissent urge
that this restriction is unambiguous, and that no deference is due the
Secretary's determination that her interim regulations are not more
restrictive than the HEW's.  In the alternative, both the claimants and the
dissent argue that regardless of whether the statutory mandate is clear,
the only interpretation of the HEW interim regulations that warrants
deference is the interpretation given those regulations by the Secretary of
HEW.  In our view, this position misunderstands the principles underlying
judicial deference to agency interpretations, as well as the scope of
authority delegated to the Secretary of Labor in the BLBRA.
    Judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous
provisions of the statutes it is authorized to implement reflects a
sensitivity to the proper roles of the political and judicial branches.
See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U. S. 837, 866 (1984) ("[F]ederal judges -- who have no constituency --
have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do");
see also Silberman, Chevron -- The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 821, 822-24 (1990).  As Chevron itself illustrates, the
resolution of ambiguity in a statutory text is often more a question of
policy than of law.  See Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2085-2088 (1990).  When Congress, through express
delegation or the introduction of an interpretive gap in the statutory
structure, has delegated policy-making authority to an administrative
agency, the extent of judicial review of the agency's policy determinations
is limited.  Cf. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, --- U. S. ---, --- (1990) ("A
precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of
administrative authority") (slip op. 10); Chevron, 467 U. S., at 864-866.
    It is precisely this recognition that informs our determination that
deference to the Secretary is appropriate here.  The Black Lung Benefits
Act has produced a complex and highly technical regulatory program.  The
identification and classification of medical eligibility criteria
necessarily require significant expertise, and entail the exercise of
judgment grounded in policy concerns.  In those circumstances, courts
appropriately defer to the agency entrusted by Congress to make such policy
determinations.  See Martin v. OSHRC, --- U. S. ---, --- (1991) (slip op.
7); Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility District,
467 U. S. 380, 390 (1984).
    In Sebben, we declined to defer to the Secretary's interpretation of
the term "criteria" as used in MDRV 902(f)(2), as including only medical
but not evidentiary criteria, because we found Congress' intent to include
all criteria in that provision to be manifest.  See Sebben, 488 U. S., at
113-114, 116.  With respect to the phrase "not . . . more restrictive
than," Congress' intent is similarly clear: the phrase cannot be read
except as a delegation of interpretive authority to the Secretary of
Labor.
    That Congress intended in the BLBRA to delegate to the Secretary of
Labor broad policy-making discretion in the promulgation of his interim
regulations is clear from the text of the statute and the history of this
provision.  Congress declined to require that the DOL adopt the HEW interim
regulations verbatim.  Rather, the delegation of authority requires only
that the DOL's regulations be "not . . . more restrictive than" HEW's.
Further, the delegation was made with the intention that the program evolve
as technological expertise matured.  The Senate Committee on Human
Resources stated:


    "It is the Committee's belief that the Secretary of Labor should have
sufficient statutory authority . . . to establish eligibility criteria . .
. .  It is intended that pursuant to this authority the Secretary of Labor
will make every effort to incorporate within his regulations . . . to the
extent feasible the advances made by medical science in the diagnosis and
treatment of pneumoconiosis . . . since the promulgation in 1972 of the
Secretary of HEW's medical eligibility criteria."  S. Rep. No. 95209, p. 13
(1977).


    In addition, the Conference Report indicated that the DOL's task was
more than simply ministerial when it informed the Secretary that "such
[new] regulations shall not provide more restrictive criteria than [the HEW
interim regulations], except that in determining claims under such criteria
all relevant medical evidence shall be considered."  H. R. Rep. No. 95-864,
p. 16 (1977) (emphasis added).  As delegated by Congress, then, the
Secretary's authority to promulgate interim regulations "not . . . more
restrictive than" the HEW interim regulations necessarily entails the
authority to interpret HEW's regulations and the discretion to promulgate
interim regulations based on a reasonable interpretation thereof.  From
this congressional delegation derives the Secretary's entitlement to
judicial deference.
    The claimants also argue that even if the Secretary of Labor's
interpretation of the HEW interim regulations is generally entitled to
deference, such deference would not be appropriate in this instance because
that interpretation has changed without explanation throughout the
litigation of these cases.  We are not persuaded.  As a general matter, of
course, the case for judicial deference is less compelling with respect to
agency positions that are inconsistent with previously held views.  See
Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 212-213 (1988).
However, the Secretary has held unswervingly to the view that the DOL
interim regulations are consistent with the statutory mandate and not more
restrictive than the HEW interim regulations.  This view obviously informed
the structure of the DOL's regulations.  In response to comments suggesting
that the DOL's proposed interim regulations might violate MDRV 902(f)(2)
because they required that all relevant evidence be considered in
determining eligibility, the Secretary replied that "the Social Security
regulations, while less explicit, similarly do not limit the evidence which
can be considered in rebutting the interim presumption."  See 43 Fed. Reg.
36,826 (1978).  Moreover, this position has been faithfully advanced by
each Secretary since the regulations were promulgated.  See e. g., Sebben,
488 U. S., at 119.  Accordingly, the Secretary's defense of her interim
regulations warrants deference from this Court.

B
    Having determined that the Secretary's position is entitled to
deference, we must decide whether this position is reasonable.  See
Chevron, 467 U. S., at 845.  The claimants and the dissent argue that this
issue can be resolved simply by comparing the two interim regulations.
This argument is straightforward; it reasons that the mere existence of
regulatory provisions permitting rebuttal of statutory elements not
rebuttable under the HEW interim regulations renders the DOL interim
regulations more restrictive than HEW's and, as a consequence renders the
Secretary's interpretation unreasonable.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 22-24.
Specifically, the claimants and the dissent assert that the HEW interim
regulations plainly contain no provision, either in the invocation
subsection or in the rebuttal subsection, that directs factual inquiry into
the issue of disability causation or the existence of pneumoconiosis.
Accordingly, under the claimants' reading of the regulations, there is no
manner in which the DOL interim regulations can be seen to be "not . . .
more restrictive than" the HEW regulations.
    The regulatory scheme, however, is not so straightforward as the
claimants would make it out to be.  We have noted before the Byzantine
character of these regulations.  See Sebben, 488 U. S., at 109 (the second
presumption is "drafted in a most confusing manner"); id., at 129
(dissenting opinion) (assuming that the drafters "promulgated a scrivener's
error").  In our view, the Secretary presents the more reasoned
interpretation of this complex regulatory structure, an interpretation that
has the additional benefit of providing coherence among the statute and the
two interim regulations.
    The premise underlying the Secretary's interpretation of the HEW
interim regulations is that the regulations were adopted to ensure that
miners who were disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine
employment would receive benefits from the black lung program.  Under the
Secretary's view, it disserves congressional intent to interpret HEW's
interim regulations to allow recovery by miners who do not have
pneumoconiosis or whose total disability did not arise, at least in part,
from their coal mine employment.  We agree.  See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 22, n. 21 (1976) ("[A]n operator can be liable
only for pneumoconiosis arising out of employment in a coal mine"); Mullins
Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U. S. 135, 158 (1987) ("[I]f a miner is not
actually suffering from the type of ailment with which Congress was
concerned, there is no justification for presuming that the miner is
entitled to benefits").
    The Secretary and the nonfederal petitioners contend that SSA
adjudications under the HEW interim regulations permitted the factual
inquiry specified in the third and fourth rebuttal provisions of the DOL
regulations.  According to the Secretary, subsection (b)(2) of HEW's
invocation provisions, and the provisions incorporated by reference into
that subsection, do the work of DOL's third and fourth rebuttal methods.
Subsection (b)(2) of the HEW interim regulations provides that in order to
invoke a presumption of eligibility the claimant must demonstrate that the
"impairment established in accordance with paragraph (b)(1) of this section
arose out of coal mine employment (see 15 410.416 and 410.456)."  20 CFR
MDRV 410.490 (b)(2) (1990).  Section 410.416(a) provides:


    "If a miner was employed for 10 years or more in the Nation's coal
mines, and is suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis, it will be
presumed, in the absence of persuasive evidence to the contrary, that the
pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment."


See also MDRV 410.456.
    The Secretary interprets the requirement in MDRV 410.490(b)(2) that the
claimant demonstrate that the miner's impairment "arose out of coal mine
employment" as comparable to the DOL's third rebuttal provision, which
permits the mine operator to show that the miner's disability "did not
arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employment."  MDRV
727.203(b)(3).  With respect to DOL's fourth rebuttal provision, the
Secretary emphasizes that the statute defines pneumoconiosis as "a chronic
dust disease . . . arising out of coal mine employment."  See 30 U. S. C.
MDRV 902(b).  Accordingly, she views the reference to 15 410.416 and
410.456 in HEW's invocation provision, and the acknowledgment within these
sections that causation is to be presumed "in the absence of persuasive
evidence to the contrary," as demonstrating that a miner who is shown not
to suffer from pneumoconiosis could not invoke HEW's presumption. {7}
    Petitioners Clinchfield and Consolidation adopt the Third Circuit's
reasoning in Pauley.  The court in Pauley relied on the reference in the
HEW rebuttal provisions to MDRV 410.412(a) (1), which in turn refers to a
miner's being "totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis."  The Third Circuit
reasoned that this reference must indicate "the intention of the Secretary
[of HEW] to permit rebuttal by a showing that the claimant's disability did
not arise at least in part from coal mine employment."  890 F. 2d, at
1302.
    The claimants respond that the Secretary has not adopted the most
natural reading of subsection (b)(2).  Specifically, the claimants argue
that miners who have 10 years of coal mine experience and satisfy the
requirements of subsection (b)(1) automatically obtain the presumption of
causation that MDRV 410.416 or MDRV 410.456 confers, and thereby satisfy
the causation requirement inherent in the Act.  In addition, the claimants
point out that the reference in the HEW rebuttal provisions to MDRV
410.412(a)(1) may best be read as a reference only to the definition of the
term "comparable and gainful work," not to the disability causation
provision of MDRV 410.412(a).  While it is possible that the claimants'
parsing of these impenetrable regulations would be consistent with accepted
canons of construction, it is axiomatic that the Secretary's interpretation
need not be the best or most natural one by grammatical or other standards.
EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U. S. 107, 115 (1988).  Rather,
the Secretary's view need be only reasonable to warrant deference.  Ibid.;
Mullins, 484 U. S., at 159.
    The claimants' assertion that the Secretary's interpretation is
contrary to the plain language of the statute ultimately rests on their
contention that subsections (b)(1)(i) and (ii) of the HEW interim
regulations create a "conclusive" presumption of entitlement without regard
to the existence of competent evidence demonstrating that the miner does
not or did not have pneumoconiosis or that the miner's disability was not
caused by coal mine employment.  This argument is deficient in two
respects.  First, the claimants' premise is inconsistent with the text of
the authorizing statute, which expressly provides that the presumptions in
question will be rebuttable, see 30 U. S. C. 15 921(c)(1), (2), and (4),
and requires the Secretary of HEW to consider all relevant evidence in
adjudicating claims under part B.  See 30 U. S. C. MDRV 923(b). {8}
    Second, the presumptions do not by their terms conclusively establish
any statutory element of entitlement.  In setting forth the two rebuttal
methods in subsection (c), the Secretary of HEW did not provide that they
would be the exclusive methods of rebuttal.  In fact, the claimants admit
that "conclusively presume" is a term they "coined" for purposes of
argument.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 34.  Although the delineation of two methods of
rebuttal may support an inference that the drafter intended to exclude
rebuttal methods not so specified, such an inference provides no guidance
where its application would render a regulation inconsistent with the
purpose and language of the authorizing statute.  See Sunstein, 90 Colum.
L. Rev., at 2109, n. 182 (recognizing that the principle expressio unius
est exclusio alterius "is a questionable one in light of the dubious
reliability of inferring specific intent from silence"); cf. Commercial
Office Products Co., 486 U. S., at 120 (plurality opinion) (rejecting the
more natural reading of statutory language because such an interpretation
would lead to "absurd or futile results . . . plainly at variance with the
policy of the legislation as a whole") (internal quotations omitted).
    In asserting that the Secretary's interpretation is untenable, the
claimants essentially argue that the Secretary is not justified in
interpreting the HEW interim regulations in conformance with their
authorizing statute.  According to the claimants, the HEW officials charged
with administering the black lung benefits program and with drafting the
HEW interim regulations believed that it was virtually impossible to
determine medically whether a miner's respiratory impairment was actually
caused by pneumoconiosis or whether his total disability arose out of his
coal mine employment.  Faced with such medical uncertainty, and instructed
to ensure the "prompt and vigorous processing of the large backlog of
claims," see 20 CFR MDRV 410.490(a) (1990), the claimants assert that HEW
omitted from its criteria factual inquiries into disability causation and
the existence of pneumoconiosis based on a "cost/benefit" conclusion that
such inquiries would engender inordinate delay yet generate little
probative evidence. {9}  The dissent presents a similar view.  Post, at
11-14.
    We recognize that the SSA, under the HEW interim regulations, appeared
to award benefits to miners whose administrative files contained scant
evidence of eligibility.  See The Comptroller General of the United States,
General Accounting Office, Report to Congress: Examination of Allegations
Concerning Administration of the Black Lung Benefits Program 6-10, included
in Hearings on H. R. 10760 and S. 3183 before the Subcommittee on Labor of
the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
440-444 (1976).  We are not, however, persuaded that this circumstance
requires the Secretary to award black lung benefits to claimants who do not
have pneumoconiosis or whose disability did not arise in whole or in part
out of coal mine employment.  As an initial matter, contemporaneous
analyses of claims approved by the HEW provide little support for the
argument that the HEW made a "cost/benefit" decision to forgo inquiry into
disease existence or disability causation.  Rather, many of the claims
allegedly awarded on the basis of insufficient evidence involved miners who
were unable to present sufficient evidence of medical disability, not those
who did not suffer from pneumoconiosis or were disabled by other causes.
See ibid.; see also, The Comptroller General of the United States, General
Accounting Office, Program to Pay Black Lung Benefits to Miners and Their
Survivors -- Improvements Are Needed, 45-47 (1977); H. R. Rep. No. 95-151,
pp. 73-74 (1977) (Minority Views and Separate Views).  Moreover, this
argument ignores entirely the advances in medical technology that have
occurred since the promulgation of the HEW interim regulations, advances
that Congress could not have intended either the HEW or the DOL to ignore
in administering the program.  See S. Rep. No. 95-209, p. 13 (1977).
    Finally, we do not accept the implicit premise of this argument: that
the Secretary cannot prevail unless she is able to demonstrate that her
interpretation of the HEW interim regulations comports with HEW's
contemporaneous interpretation of those regulations.  As is stated above,
the Secretary's interpretation of HEW's interim regulations is entitled to
deference so long as it is reasonable.  An interpretation that harmonizes
an agency's regulations with their authorizing statute is presumptively
reasonable, and claimants have not persuaded us that the presumption is
unfounded in this case.

IV
    We conclude that the Secretary of Labor has not acted unreasonably, or
inconsistently with MDRV 902(f)(2) of the Black Lung Benefits Act, in
promulgating interim regulations that permit the presumption of entitlement
to black lung benefits to be rebutted with evidence demonstrating that the
miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis or that the miner's
disability does not, or did not, arise out of coal mine employment.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Third Circuit in No. 89-1714.
The judgments of the Fourth Circuit in No. 90-113 and No. 90-114 are
reversed, and those cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.  No costs are allowed in any of these cases.
It is so ordered.


    Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this
litigation.







------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1
    Pneumoconiosis was identified by the Surgeon General as "a chronic
chest disease caused by the accumulation of fine coal dust particles in the
human lung."  S. Rep. No. 95-209, p. 5 (1977).  What he described as simple
pneumoconiosis seldom produces significant ventilation impairment, but it
may reduce the ability of the lung to transfer oxygen to the blood.
Complicated pneumoconiosis is a more serious disease, for the patient
"incurs progressive massive fibrosis as a complex reaction to dust and
other factors."  In its complicated stage, pneumoconiosis "usually produces
marked pulmonary impairment and considerable respiratory disability."
Ibid.

2
    Although the 1972 amendments did not direct the Secretary of HEW to
promulgate these new interim regulations, the Report of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare contained a strongly worded
invitation to do so.  See S. Rep. No. 92-743, p. 18 (1972) ("Accordingly,
the Committee expects the Secretary to adopt such interim evidentiary rules
and disability evaluation criteria as will permit prompt and vigorous
processing of the large backlog of claims consistent with the language and
intent of these amendments").

3
    In light of this Court's decision in Sebben, the Court of Appeals
interpreted MDRV 410.490(c) as permitting rebuttal of the presumption on a
showing that the claimant's disability was not caused by coal mine
employment.  895 F. 2d, at 183.  The court therefore remanded the case for
further consideration of that issue.  It appears that the Fourth Circuit
has since retreated from this view, and now considers the HEW interim
regulations to permit only two rebuttal methods.  See Robinette v.
Director, OWCP, 902 F. 2d 1566 (CA4 1990) (judgment entry), cert. pending,
No. 90-172.

4
    In light of this conclusion, the Board found it unnecessary to review
the determination that Consolidation had successfully rebutted the
presumption under subsection (b)(2) of the DOL interim regulations.

5
    In addition to the Third Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has concluded
that the third rebuttal provision of the DOL interim regulation is not more
restrictive than the criteria applied by the HEW.  See Patrich v. Old Ben
Coal Co., 926 F. 2d 1482, 1488 (1991).  The Seventh Circuit did not address
the fourth rebuttal provision.  The Sixth Circuit also has refused to
invalidate the third and fourth rebuttal provisions of the DOL interim
regulation, and continues to apply these provisions to all part C claims,
regardless of whether the presumption is invoked under MDRV 410.490 or MDRV
727.203.  See Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Co. v. Milliken, 866 F. 2d 195,
202 (1989).

6
    In Sebben, the Court concluded that the DOL interim regulations were
more restrictive than the HEW's to the extent that the DOL's invocation
provision did not permit invocation of the presumption without 10 years of
coal mining experience.  See 488 U. S., at 113.  The Sebben Court did not
address the issue now before us: the validity of the third and fourth
rebuttal provisions contained in the DOL interim regulations.  See id., at
119.

7
    The Court's conclusion in Sebben that subsection (b)(2) of the HEW's
interim regulations was not a rebuttal provision does not foreclose the
Secretary's argument, as the Sebben Court made clear that that provision
was, nonetheless, a "substantive requirement."  See Sebben, 488 U. S., at
120.  We agree with the Patrich court that "there is no meaningful
difference between a procedure which creates a presumption and then allows
evidence to rebut it and one which denies the presumption in the first
place if the same evidence is offered."  See Patrich, 926 F. 2d, at 1488.

8
    That no element of the presumptions at issue was intended to be
conclusive is further indicated by the language of the remaining two
provisions in this section of the statute.  In MDRV 921(c)(3), Congress
demonstrated its ability to create an irrebuttable presumption, applicable
to a miner for whom the medical evidence demonstrates the presence of
complicated pneumoconiosis.  Perhaps more telling is MDRV 921(c)(4), the
only section of the statute in which Congress addressed the available
methods of rebuttal.  In that section, Congress created a rebuttable
presumption of eligibility applicable to a miner with 15 years or more of
coal mine employment, for whom evidence demonstrates the existence of a
totally disabling respiratory disease but whose X rays do not reveal
complicated pneumoconiosis.  With respect to this presumption, Congress
expressly provided: "The Secretary may rebut such presumption only by
establishing that (A) such miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis,
or that (B) his respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of,
or in connection with, employment in a coal mine."  Written as a limiting
provision, this section indicates Congress' understanding that these
rebuttal methods are among those permitted with respect to other
presumption provisions.

9
    The claimants support this argument by reference to the HEW's Coal
Miner's Benefits Manual (1979), which they claim represents the agency's
contemporaneous interpretation of its regulation.  Claimants assert that
the Manual "nowhere suggests" that the HEW interim regulations permit
factual inquiry into the existence of pneumoconiosis or disability
causation.  The Manual, however, does not demonstrate that HEW understood
its interim regulations to preclude rebuttal with facts similar to DOL's
third and fourth rebuttal provisions.  At best, this document is ambiguous
with respect to the statutory elements susceptible of rebuttal.  See Manual
MDRV IB6(e) (stating that the presumption of entitlement to benefits "may
be rebutted if . . . (3) Biopsy or autopsy findings clearly establish that
no pneumoconiosis exists").  We find it more revealing that, in outlining
the general structure of the interim regulations, the Manual makes clear
that "[t]o establish entitlement to benefits on the basis of a coal miner's
total disability due to pneumoconiosis, a claimant must submit the evidence
necessary to establish that he is a coal miner . . . who is . . . totally
disabled due to pneumoconiosis, and that his pneumoconiosis arose out of
employment in the Nation's coal mines."  MDRV IB1.